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Much of modern philosophy is informed by clinical practice in psychopathology and advanced 
medicine, but what about the reverse? What is modern philosophy’s contribution to medicine and 
clinical practice? One such contribution is in the creation of bioethical standards, such as the concepts 
of dignified death and brain death, and bioethical reviews for clinical research. However, establishing 
guidelines based on ethical standards is not a complete solution for individual clinical cases 
presenting philosophical or ethical questions; rather, overly systematic ethical standards impede 
patients’ free thought and may prove to be a barrier to finding the optimum in a particular clinical 
scenario. This paper does not provide valuable data for understanding the human condition by 
“philosophizing based on clinical practice,” nor does it aim to set out standards by “philosophizing 
about clinical practice”: it explores the significance and methods of “philosophizing in clinical 
practice” as carried out by those involved and presents new findings on the relationship between 
modern philosophy and clinical practice. 
1. The Patient-Centered Approach 
Veatch postulates four categories–the Engineering Model, the Priestly Model, the Collegial Model, and 
the Contractual Model–for an ideal physician-patient relationship,1 while Beauchamp and Childress 
present four general principles–“respect for autonomy,” “beneficence,” “non-maleficence,” and 
“justice” 2 –as guiding principles for medicine 3  in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Modern 
medicine has been led by historical reflection and a rise in societal awareness of human rights to 
reconsider its long-standing paternalism, wherein physicians are given full authority over their 
patients and determine all courses of treatment, but, as evident in the Hippocratic oath of ancient 
times, the historical, underlying attitude and ideology among medical practitioners has been one of 
using their own capacities to provide care “on the patient’s behalf.” In other words, while the subject 
of optimum choices for the patient and the decision-making process are undergoing change, medical 
treatment continues to be an act on behalf of the patient. If we accept Parsons’ statement that a 
“service may be defined most generally as any act of an individual insofar as it contributes to the 
realization of the ends of other individuals,” 4  then medical practice is a service carried out by 
professional bodies (medical practitioners) to realize the act of treating a patient’s illness. In other 
words, medical practice may be described as a social act wherein the patient is the object of the 
service.5 When medical practice is thus positioned as the social act of professional bodies granted 
specific qualifications, it is accompanied by responsibilities and thus enters the public realm. 
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With the advancements in medical techniques, the emergence of various treatment methods and 
possibilities, and when with quality of life (QOL) becoming an important aspect among the various 
options, “patient focused medicine” and “patient rights” have become important issues. This is 
typified in medical care for terminally ill patients with untreatable illnesses: clinical practice in 
palliative care and hospice care. 
When faced with the prospect of impending death, terminally ill patients experience a range of 
losses. For example, cancer patients may experience an anguished sense of losing their human dignity 
as they gradually and painfully lose physical function, become unable to live independently, or can 
no longer eat or excrete waste. Further, as their illness progresses, patients lose the social standing 
attached to the jobs, roles, and other positions that they have hitherto fulfilled. This leads to the loss 
of various prior human connections. Such losses experienced by terminally ill patients are 
fundamentally unrecoverable and will continue until death. In addition, practical responsibilities like 
inheritance and the livelihoods of their surviving families can add further pressure. As end-of-life 
care requires responding to the various forms of loss and suffering experienced by such patients, 
palliative care is provided by teams comprising a range of specialists. Officially, patients’ physical 
treatment and assistance are provided by doctors and nurses, while the social aspect is covered by 
social workers, and the psychological side by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, with each 
professional body making full use of its capacities to eliminate as much suffering as possible by close 
communication with patients and their families. However, while a role is assigned to each specialist, 
wholesome care cannot be provided by a system that follows complete division of labor. As in cases 
of physical pain engendering psychological depression or psychological depression lowering immune 
function, loss and suffering of different types interact with one another as they accumulate. Patients 
do not feel each of these forms of suffering separately, but experience them as “total pain.” Therefore, 
we need “holistic care” that considers individual circumstances and symptoms as a whole rather than 
separately and follows an appropriate course of action with consideration for balance. To do this, we 
also need cooperation among specialist colleagues. Furthermore, the guiding principle of “respect for 
autonomy” posits that the final criterion in the judgment of what is appropriate and optimal rests 
with the patient him/herself, rather than with the doctor, meaning that modern medicine requires a 
structure in which the patient, while the object of treatment, provides the basis for decision-making, 
whereby the specialists approach the patient’s experiences and, in collaboration, demonstrate their 
individual capacities. This is what is known as the “patient-centered approach.” Positioning respect 
for the patient’s autonomy as a guiding principle, modern medicine has seen patient-centered 
approaches applied to all clinical practices. In the case of end-of-life care, which looks for ways to 
attend patients to the last rather than aim for cure through treatment, this approach is practiced 
under a clear framework whereby the patient’s specific circumstances and decision-making are 
supported by the attending team, as opposed to being treated as a one-size-fits-all option provided by 
doctors specializing in cure. 
2. Philosophical Suffering in Patients 
Among the various categories of suffering experienced by terminally ill patients is the suffering 
provoked by an awareness of their own death. Modern medicine can certainly prolong the life of the 
patient, but it cannot completely conquer mortality. Feelings of fear, anxiety, and hopelessness 
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regarding death thus arise instinctively in all living creatures, and, since these feelings are not 
abnormal, they are not problems to be resolved psychiatrically. Suffering in the face of death is not 
exclusive to terminally ill patients but is an emotion that may be experienced at any time by anyone, 
sharing as we do the same human fate. It is a universal philosophical and religious question, not being 
limited to death itself, but encompassing the resulting, inescapable contemplation of the meaning of 
life and the view of life and death. In other words, this suffering in the face of death is a potentially 
unresolvable issue that transcends the treatment framework. Although beyond the expertise of 
medical practitioners, this suffering is clearly observable in clinical practice, as described above, it 
interacts with patients’ other losses and suffering to form “total pain,” meaning that it becomes a 
problem that cannot be ignored, and thereby becomes a societal issue. 
At the 1998 World Health Assembly, the World Health Organization (WHO) laid out an amendment 
to its definition of health, adding the new aspect “spiritual” to the preexisting categories of physical, 
mental, and social.6 There followed an enthusiastic adoption of the “spiritual” concept within end-of-
life care; the aforementioned suffering regarding death was re-conceptualized under the title 
“spiritual pain,” and “spiritual care”–care in response to spiritual pain–began to be considered within 
the purview of end-of-life care.  
Currently, the delivery of spiritual care in clinical practice is chiefly assumed by religious figures 
such as chaplains. Religious figures in end-of-life care do not insist on their own religious outlooks 
but are members of care teams who listen to their patients’ own perspectives on life and death and 
guide them in changing or deepening these perspectives. Indeed, there are endless examples of 
patients who were not previously religious discovering faith when confronted with death. While 
some criticize this as “the opium of the people,” this is an impractical stance from the perspective of 
spiritual care, wherein the scientific validity of a religious worldview that includes an afterworld is 
not an essential question for the terminally ill patient. Moreover, the existence or non-existence of an 
afterworld being impossible to investigate scientifically, the question for the patient is whether to 
believe in this unverifiable doctrine, and there is no practical motivation for criticizing the patient’s 
attitude. Further, if a patient is able to find hope through belief for an afterlife following the death of 
the body, this can be a fulfillment of patient care in removing or providing relief from spiritual pain. 
Contrary to the above criticism, religious care may therefore be described as an effective method that 
should be actively implemented. Numerous cases attest to the efficacy of spiritual care as part of 
holistic care, provided by religious figures and erasing feelings of tragedy regarding death. 
Of course, spiritual care provided by religious figures is not always guaranteed to erase or alleviate 
spiritual pain. Some patients do not embrace faith even when facing death or in other critical 
situations, some continue to reject religious narratives, and others, despite having previously held 
some kind of religious outlook on life and death, find that they can no longer believe in it in their 
critical condition. Religion cannot always provide succor from spiritual pain. While the concept of 
“spirituality” is rooted in religion and should be discussed in terms of its relationship to 
transcendence or an afterlife, the WHO states that “‘spiritual’ . . . is not the same as ‘religious’” and 
describes spirituality as an aspect of human life, including religious components, “often . . . concerned 
with [the] meaning and purpose [of life].”7 Against the backdrop of the present-day decline in religion, 
it cannot be considered practical to rely on religious perspectives alone when responding to a 
terminally ill patient’s awareness of death. When considering a patient’s suffering regarding life and 
death from a realistic standpoint, it is necessary to consider a broader definition of “spiritual pain.” 
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The introduction of a philosophical element, particularly Jaspers’ existential philosophy, reveals new 
horizons regarding the specific nature of spiritual pain and communication in spiritual care. 
3. Death as a Boundary Situation 
The theory of boundary situations developed by philosopher and psychiatrist Jaspers in his chief 
work Philosophy 8  offers insights into the philosophical suffering encountered in today’s clinical 
practice. Boundary situations “never change. . . . They are like a wall we run into, a wall on which we 
founder”; they are situations within which we exist by necessity, thereby delimiting the finiteness of 
humanity. Further, Jaspers proposes four “individual boundary situations”-four specific boundary 
situations that all will necessarily experience:9 death (Tod), suffering (Leiden), struggle (Kampf), and 
guilt (Schuld). 
For Jaspers, the concept of the boundary (Grenze) is not of an ultimate limit beyond which there is 
nothing. While, in its aspect as an inescapable wall delineating the finite nature of humanity, the 
boundary situation certainly engenders hopelessness and anxiety, Jaspers proposes that beyond lies 
a domain of Existenz that transcends objectivity, rationality, and generality. In other words, he 
postulates that beyond the inevitable boundary of a position that perceives the world and the self 
immaterially and rationally lies an existential awareness without a subject-object split (Subjekt-
Objekt-Spaltung) and an awakening to an attitude toward life based on this awareness. The boundary 
situation is positioned as the border (Grenze) to this. 
However, whether boundary situations are inevitable occurrences or not, those who have been 
conscious of them will not necessarily be awakened to the domain of Existenz. Of death, an individual 
boundary situation, Jaspers states that “death as an objective fact of existence is not a boundary 
situation.”10 Thus, perception of death as a mere idea or piece of information, or distortion of one’s 
understanding of death due to false perception, results in not experiencing a boundary situation as a 
boundary situation. In other words, an individual boundary situation consisting of a particular 
occurrence is not itself a boundary situation, but becomes one only once the perceiving subject 
responds to it as something concerning him/herself, is conscious of his/her own finite nature, and 
expresses the emotions accompanying this, such as fear, anxiety, hopelessness, or absurdity. 11 
Awareness of boundary situations and their accompanying emotions threatens the everyday values 
and rational attitudes of one’s life so far and makes an appeal for an Existenz that encompasses a new 
domain of life. At that moment, within the sense of urgency entailed by one’s awareness of a 
boundary situation, one undertakes a sorting of what is vital to one’s own Existenz, described by 
Jaspers’ statement that “the most innocuous act, objectively speaking, may have the weight of 
essentiality when Existenz comes to appear in it.”12 In other words, having become aware of our own 
finite nature, we reinterpret the world (Wiederholung) in terms of what we still need. Death, in 
particular, signifying a non-being contradictory to life and possessing a singular unknowability and 
impossibility of being experienced, presents a “definite boundary situation” that affirms the existence 
of Existenz, expressed in Jaspers’ statement that “death is . . . the mirror of Existenz.”13  
Through the experience of a boundary situation, a subjective life perspective unique to the “I, here, 
now,” and which has transcended rationality and objectivity, is decided (Entscheidung). However, an 
existential decision does not disregard objectivity and rationality; on the contrary, they are closely 
examined to produce the foundering–the awakening to the boundary–through which it is considered 
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essential to pass. Due to this dialectical process, a decision originating in the awareness of a boundary 
situation, while subjective, gains a generality definitively different from a mere arbitrary, selfish 
whim. However, this decision, rather than demonstrating a systematic philosophy, appears each time 
as the life philosophy of a single moment (Augenblick), with another moment bringing the decision 
of a different outlook. 
Moreover, our certainty of Existenz is immediately pushed from our consciousness by the clamor 
of everyday life, and we are unable to live with a continued awareness of a boundary situation. Even 
those in harsh conditions show an instinctive desire to attempt to avoid or conceal their distress, one 
cannot maintain constant philosophical contemplation; on the contrary, those in distress display a 
tendency to attempt to proceed while ignoring the painful reality. Jaspers believed that most people 
do not recognize boundary situations as such and do not arrive at the certainty of Existenz, making 
this the subject of his own philosophical practice.14 
4. The Possibility of Philosophizing in Modern Clinical Practice 
Could Jaspers’ theory of the boundary situation be integrated into concrete modern practices? In the 
increasingly civilized modern era, there are fewer opportunities in daily life for struggle, crime, or 
encountering death, thanks to developments such as stable supply of food, improved public sanitation, 
and reduced infant mortality. Boundary situations force our human finiteness upon us causing us to 
founder, but modern civilization, in expanding the range of human possibility, is succeeding in 
eliminating, from our daily experience and consciousness, specific events that form individual 
boundary situations. While society becoming plentiful and peaceful and the world developing into a 
reassuring place free of death may well be considered good for both individuals and the human race 
as a whole, modern humanity pays a price in the loss of opportunities to contemplate our lives 
philosophically or religiously through an awareness of our own and others’ deaths. Negative events 
such as boundary situations create awareness of the reality of the world and of ourselves, thus 
playing a role in the formation of the attitudes to life and the view of life and death that can become 
the guiding principles of our lives. Consequently, they foster life fulfillment and the ability to respond 
in a crisis; yet, in the present day, there is a decline in religious belief and it is becoming difficult to 
understand the meaning of this kind of contemplation, let alone understand its utility. 
However, even as we turn from death and strive to prolong average life expectancy, the 
inescapability of death remains unchanged. The fact that, despite this, people in the present day have 
no opportunity to encounter death in everyday life is because death in the modern age is relegated to 
sites where care or medical treatment is administered, locations unfrequented in the course of daily 
life. Following ages when, as a rule, people died at home, attended by their families, death has now 
become the target of medicine and has come to be managed within medical services. Further, the 
suffering expressed in care and medical facilities, occasioned by the awareness of death, has been 
termed “spiritual pain,” and it is becoming a societal issue as a target of philosophical and religious 
care. At the same time, this situation also signifies that end-of-life clinical practice is a rare present-
day scenario offering the opportunity to be aware of a boundary situation and to philosophize about 
life and death. In other words, spiritual care in end-of-life clinical practice could become an important 
base as a site in which Jaspers’ philosophy can be put to practice. 
This raises the question of whether terminally ill patients with no choice but to be conscious of an 
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approaching and inescapable death are aware of their boundary situations. As stated earlier, 
awareness of a boundary situation requires consciousness of one’s limited reality being an inevitable 
and inescapable issue concerning oneself, but ascertaining objectively whether someone else 
possesses this consciousness presents difficulties. Further, as discussed previously, existential 
decisions are adopted following perception of an objective, rational boundary, and yet, no objective 
criterion exists by which one can clearly distinguish these decisions from simple inspiration or 
emotional fluctuation. 
As Kübler-Ross’s five-stage psychological model demonstrates, the thoughts and feelings of 
terminally ill patients progressively alter with the passage of time;15 however, it would be rash to 
equate this with a philosophical transformation accompanied by an awareness of their boundary 
situations. On the contrary, modern medicine, including palliative care, tends to not only avoid 
creating an awareness of boundary situations, but also prevent patients from perceiving this. 
Administering appropriate treatment and care with respect to the patient’s wishes while minimizing 
suffering as far as possible, “for the patient’s sake,” has been the patient-centered approach. For those 
without experiences in which individual boundary situations were a catalyst that allowed them to 
gain a positive view of life and death, unresolvable individual boundary situations are nothing more 
than negative realities that cause suffering. Possibilities that would allow the patient to be spared 
awareness of these boundary situations therefore become the optimal choices for the patient and 
medical professionals. 
The societal taboo toward discussing death and suffering and the standardization and automation 
of decision-making relating to life and death within medical and social systems are particular drivers 
of this. Because people do not experience boundary situations in their everyday lives, they are ill-
equipped to deal with them when they are imminent; they seek and follow the advice of “specialists” 
even regarding important decisions about themselves or loved ones. As specialists, medical 
professionals are required to provide advice from a rational and impartial perspective, resulting in 
decisions that are inevitably standardized to a degree. Of course, this decision-making process avoids 
a paternalist approach led by medical professionals; rather, decisions are made within a structure 
that respects the autonomy of the patient, whereby he or she selects from a number of presented 
options, accompanied by explanations and advice from medical professionals.  
Nevertheless, choices founded on respect for autonomy are not analogous to decisions based on the 
patient’s philosophical and religious contemplation. Patients will sometimes bow to societal or 
practical demands implicitly validated by medical professionals, or suppress their genuine wishes 
during the decision-making process due to concern for their families. While going as far as repressing 
one’s own wishes and opt for an altruistic act is certainly one mode of autonomous attitude, the fact 
that the option selected by the individual is not necessarily that which is best for the individual surely 
merits some investigation into choice. However, choices made by patients themselves rule out further 
study by genuinely–both formally and psychologically–being decisions taken autonomously and 
freely by the patient. This is because finding the optimum for a patient cannot be guided by 
rationality; neither is it guaranteed purely by the patient’s free choice. Also, since it is impossible to 
test, no question is raised about whether there could have been another better option among the 
various possibilities. Approaches to life cannot be judged objectively such that a structure compliant 
with respect for autonomy divests us of opportunities to advance further toward the optimal through 
criticism of autonomous decisions as they are today. Further, the medical framework is able to 
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manage decision-making smoothly and indirectly while maintaining its respect for autonomy 
sacrosanct by incorporating other practical and rational elements; this handling, under the pretext 
that “it is what the patient him/herself wanted,” is irreproachable. In the present day, with its fully 
realized framework within which medical treatment that aims to alleviate suffering reaches out to 
and guides patients lost in the face of their boundary situations, the response to a boundary situation 
is not a problem contemplated philosophically or religiously by an individual, but it has come to be 
treated as an issue to be resolved practically by society and medical treatment.16 
Spiritual care within the framework of medicine follows the principle of minimizing a patient’s 
suffering, yet, according to Jaspers’ philosophy, this principle becomes an impediment to the goal of 
maximizing the patient’s QOL through holistic care. Jaspers’ philosophy relating to increasing QOL–
involving “philosophizing (Philosophieren),” “certainty of Existenz,” “life fulfillment,” and “self-
realization”–requires a process in which we perceive boundary situations to concern ourselves, and 
despair. Jaspers postulates that beyond awareness of the hopelessness of a boundary situation is an 
existential life that has overcome hopelessness, and he positions this as superior to a life without 
consciousness of boundary situations, as expressed in his statement that “from this nothingness . . . 
alone can I obtain my assurance of true Existenz.”17  
However, the philosophical attitude described by Jaspers lacks supporting evidence and, as 
discussed above, is an abstract idea short even of standards by which to ascertain the kind of outlook 
that fulfills its criteria. Further, deliberately encouraging a patient suffering from illness and various 
other kinds of loss to turn his/her attention to death and the harsh reality is not a practical philosophy 
within clinical practice. The question of how to approach a patient and assume a position appropriate 
to his or her mental state is important in clinical practice, and acting against the patient’s wishes 
beyond the realm of medical treatment is unacceptable. While it is the wish of the patient (care 
recipient) that is respected in the patient-centered approach, it is the decision made by the patient 
(person) after correctly recognizing the world and him/herself that is respected in philosophy. The 
former functions rationally and systematically, while, the latter is subjective and makes no promise 
to eliminate suffering. As a result, it is impossible to prove that philosophizing in clinical practice is 
superior to the patient-centered approach. 
5. “Loving Struggle” as Existential Communication 
Because medicine is a social service, the patient cannot, in principle, be given unnecessary suffering. 
Further, so long as treatment and care are administered in compliance with ethical principles, such 
as respect for autonomy, this attitude is irreproachable. However, there are patients who contemplate 
and agonize over their own lives and deaths, and, among them are those who hide their own suffering 
and are unable to discuss life and death owing to their concern for others. A compliance by medical 
professionals in their capacities as specialists of questions of appropriate treatment and even of 
respect for autonomy regarding these patients could be considered a thorough fulfillment of their 
duties. However, is there another way to improve patient QOL, beyond the performance of one’s 
duties as specialists–as human beings approaching these suffering patients? 
For Jaspers, this would simply be philosophizing in the awareness of one’s boundary situation, but 
a specific method for this can be suggested in the form of “existential communication.” Awareness of 
a boundary situation, particularly in the current era of religious decline, entails a sudden critical 
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viewing of one’s prior values and way of life based on a general, rational, and practical worldview, 
and a sinking into despair, regret, and a sense of meaninglessness; yet, when we yearn for something 
and strive to live despite this, the philosophizing begins. This “something” can be described as a 
subjective life outlook drawn from the domain of Existenz, or as “subjective truth.” Necessary to reach 
this is the existence of other people. Jaspers states that boundary situations “rend all conclusive being 
and thus show the doubtfulness of all we know. But it is in those situations alone that man begins the 
unconditional activity in which his self turns toward another self.”18 In other words, when one who 
has perceived a boundary situation and experienced hopelessness seeks to escape his or her present 
discontent and sense of powerlessness, he or she becomes aware of the boundary of what is attainable 
by a single, limited human and seeks out others. This is not, however, an entrusting of all points of 
reference to another as in the placing of one’s faith in a god in a religious context, but rather, a 
position of collaborative philosophizing with the other (Symphilosophieren) to consider one’s own 
unique life outlook, even while aware of one’s own narrow scope. 
Existential communication is neither the communication of knowledge from one party to another 
nor the collaborative discovery of shared answers as in academic research. While general knowledge 
can be useful, it is never enough in boundary situations and is merely something that must be 
surmounted. Beyond that kind of shareable fact are subjective decisions, attitudes unique to the 
individual due to that very subjectivity and by no means derived from compromise with others. The 
goal of existential communication is for those who have become aware of a boundary situation to 
discover one another’s unique attitudes. In other words, it is not for one unaware of a boundary 
situation to impart something to the other, nor is it for one or the other to be the focus. Further, as 
this communication deepens, each party comes to understand the other, while, simultaneously, the 
differences between the self and the other become clear, precisely because both parties seek out the 
other’s unique life outlook. Attitudes that do not permit accommodation of the other bring a sense of 
isolation as they concurrently increase feelings of solidarity. 
The most significant feature of existential communication is that it is held to be a form of “struggle,” 
one of individual boundary situations. In other words, it does not entail an amicable relationship in 
which both parties benefit the other, but one in which it is sometimes necessary to hurt or distress 
the other. This is because the reality of the boundary situation is one that inevitably causes suffering. 
Existential communication is the suspension of one’s sociable nature, the deliberate confrontation of 
the hopeless reality that we prefer not to consider or approach in daily life, without hesitating to 
cause suffering to one’s interlocutor, and the revelation of one’s individual perception of the world 
and oneself to the other, all to achieve an “instant” of life in this world without discontent. For this to 
happen, there must be unreserved openness, equality, and trust between the two parties, and an 
absence of self-interest, shame, hesitancy, and similar feelings. Jaspers describes this relationship as 
“loving struggle (liebender Kampf),” an irreplaceable relationship in which we confront one another 
without recourse to violence or authority and at risk to ourselves for the sake of the truths of each 
party. The “love” of this loving struggle is not the Christian benevolence that aims to give to the other 
(Caritas), but Socratic love that seeks truth alongside the other (Eros).19  
Within this philosophical relationship, there is no guiding toward a subjective decision in the form 
of choosing a particular option from a selection thought up by the other party. Although beginning 
one’s contemplations with an investigation into the preexisting options can certainly be useful, 
philosophizing emphasizes the drawing up of options within a free state without presuppositions. 
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Considering, without preconceptions, what can be done in the “I, here, now” and deciding from 
among these possibilities the attitude most valuable to one’s life, while revealing the self, perceiving 
the differences and uniqueness of the life of another through contact with it, and correctly perceiving 
oneself and the world, is one autonomous act, as is choosing something that suits one from the choices 
offered by one’s pre-existing rational, general, and practical values–yet these are completely different 
operations in philosophical terms. 
6. Those Philosophizing Together and Those Supporting the Philosophizing 
For those experiencing spiritual pain, the important thing is that which supports the life of the “I, 
here, now.” For the person in suffering and isolation, another person who supports them in this is 
necessary, and this is exactly the role fulfilled by the palliative care teams of terminally ill patients. 
Of course, from the perspective of total pain, it is indisputable that systematic treatment based on 
guidelines and other frameworks is necessary, as care that improves the patient’s physical, mental, 
and social situation is clearly effective for spiritual pain, while understanding the spiritual aspect as 
objectively as possible can surely be considered a necessary task when considering the optimal course 
in specific aspects such as cancer treatment options. However, decisions made existentially are based 
on a freedom that transcends rationality and objectivity and may therefore conflict with medical 
norms, as in the case of Jehovah's Witnesses’ refusal of blood transfusions; moreover, they offer no 
guarantee of a happy result. The subjective truths brought forth through existential communication 
must go beyond right and wrong as prescribed by rational and societal values, bypassing concerns 
about suffering of our communication partners. A means of philosophizing that embraces attendant 
risk and leaves preconceptions behind, existential communication can admit even suicide and thus 
presents dangers when treated as a mode of spiritual care as part of medical services; there is no duty 
or obligation to do so. However, it is also true that the existence of another person with whom to 
share this suffering and contemplate attitudes to life increases QOL for patients experiencing spiritual 
pain. 
Who could this other person be who could enable existential communication in clinical practice? 
Jaspers alludes to the possibility of existential communication between physician and patient.20 The 
physician is certainly in a superior position relative to the patient in terms of physical, mental, and 
social situation, and it is undeniable that he or she administers treatment based on his or her 
authority as a physician. However, communication by means of this authority is “only a part, never 
the whole, of the doctor’s attitude to the patient.”21 A doctor can also communicate in his or her role 
as “not a pure technician nor pure authority, but Existence itself for its own sake, a transient human 
creature like his [or her] patient.”22 On the specifics of existential communication, Jaspers merely 
states that it is not something that can be expressed by a code of conduct23 and so “it is not theory but 
[the] example [of the psychotherapist able to take part in existential communication] which teaches 
us what manner of man he may be.”24 This kind of communication between human equals without 
any shrinking from the other can surely be seen in scenes of palliative care and the wordless contact 
that Mother Theresa practiced in her “Home for the Dying.” However, from a broad perspective, 
medical professionals have a societal existence that carries the responsibility and obligation to 
provide a service, and they may find it difficult to take the risk of challenging the status quo by 
deliberately causing a patient suffering. Further, pouring tremendous time and effort into the 
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specialist work with which they are entrusted in a modern medical system that does not currently 
provide an environment conducive to their philosophizing is impossible. 
The first alternatives to medical professionals as existential communication partners are family 
and friends. Family and friends know the patient well and a relationship of trust is already 
established. Furthermore, they do not have the responsibilities and professional restraints, such as 
non-maleficence, shared by medical professionals, thereby fulfilling the conditions for open and 
equal discussion of life and death. However, family members have their own particular concerns 
precisely because of the involvement of their loved ones. Societal familial obligations, diffidence and 
shame over being too intimate, pride that prevents willingness to show weakness, hesitancy to bring 
up a topic that is for their own benefit, and, above all, concern over sufferinging the other party by 
facing the negative reality all currently form a barrier to existential communication within the family. 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the ideal other for existential communication is a beloved family 
member or friend. This is because the patient’s family and friends, as the people who make up his or 
her reason for living, have a high likelihood of being directly connected to the life outlook at which 
the patient will arrive. Moreover, their existential communication with the patient can lead, through 
their own concurrent contemplation, to philosophically and socially valuable results in their 
discovery of views of life and death and outlooks that alleviate grief, which can come to guide them 
in their own lives. In other words, this is a returning to daily life of the boundary situations that are 
usually relegated to the sites of care and medical treatment–unfrequented in the course of everyday 
life–and treated systematically. 
In truth, most patients are unlikely to actively look for an opportunity to disclose their own 
suffering and hopelessness, out of concern for medical professionals and their families and friends. 
In terms of treatment, this is not a problem and there is no norm or comparison by which this is 
judged to be an erroneous attitude. However, although there are no clear standards or proofs, there 
are personal examples of other parties undertaking existential communication and of patients’ QOL 
being improved, and there is surely sense in creating environments open to that possibility. In 
concrete terms, these environments where patients and their families and friends could discuss their 
own lives and deaths without anxiety are likely to be found in environments created by third parties. 
I will not provide a detailed description of the means of creating such spaces here, but with boundary 
situations being currently relegated to the site of medical treatment and care, the creation of these 
environments should be the work of medical professionals or specialist treatment teams. 
Conclusion 
Treating illness and removing suffering as far as is possible is the goal of medicine, yet this is not the 
aim of human life. Health is but a means to the end of living. Despite this, current medical treatment 
that aims for health and the absence of suffering is causing a distortion that determines human 
attitudes to life and death. Furthermore, this distortion is being left to take its course due to a principle 
that states that we cannot judge human life objectively. This distortion and its neglect, perpetrated in 
the sites of clinical practice to which boundary situations have been relegated and which we do not 
ordinarily encounter, have led to the current situation in which we are deprived of the possibility of 
living better in philosophical or religious terms. 
Transcending the framework of medical treatment to open the possibility of philosophizing in 
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clinical practice is a practice recommended by both clinical practice and philosophy, as a means of 
alleviating patients’ suffering, promoting views of life and death in those around them, and guiding 
contemplation of every unique attitude to life. 
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